Vietnam Military Advisors - This question was created on the SWC thread 'Green on Blue' (pgs.14-15) by 'TheCurmudgeon' with questions and "lurker" moi adds his comments: Vietnam has a lot of problems with the Vietnamese military even if they attack the Americans
. Don't make the news that troops are in Afghanistan - sadly, they are. In one incident (recorded in the archives), the entire council was removed due to the threat of a local "friendly" army. I heard other things.
Vietnam Military Advisors
Source: www.asomf.org
Of course, there is a lot of history on the part of Van Porter Wenner and other advisers who risked their careers by speaking and writing honestly about the real possibility of a Vietnam war. In early 1965, the Viet Cong overthrew the Saigon regime and took control of two-thirds of the rural population.
In May 1961, JFK authorized the deployment of an additional 500 Special Forces troops and military advisers to assist the Western government in South Vietnam. By the end of 1962 there were about 11,000 military advisers in South Vietnam.
That year, 53 military personnel were killed. The President will soon send more military advisers to assist the South Vietnamese army. By the end of 1963 this figure had increased to 16,000. "When you're completely immersed in a culture, counseling hurts you. By the time my counseling process was over, I had contracted malaria, mononucleosis, diarrhea, and hepatitis. "I dropped to 123 pounds.
You repeat it about us when you say "by Western leaders". Many anti-communist Vietnamese are relieved that they can live in a non-communist part of Vietnam. They have their own opinions and motivations. They don't call out "Western leaders" and
Not asking what they should think. They already know. The Catholic you mentioned is an example. They realized they didn't like communism very much, so they acted accordingly. Your statement about Catholicism seems to that their ideas are illegitimate and that their political activities should be discounted. I think they might disagree with you. Did they continue to fight for another decade, apparently; but during most of that time, the US Army
in the country (along with others providing air power and naval artillery support) pushed them forward and continued to fight. We still do not understand the role of ideology in nationalist movements, and we are more ideological today than we were in the 1950s.
Source: i.pinimg.com
This is our greatest obstacle in reaching the logical framework of grand strategy that works for the world we live in today. We simply cannot take the strategic lessons we refuse to learn. Strategies are easier to discuss.
Indeed, the experience of the US military offensive in Vietnam has prompted a broader search for souls in the service about how they did business and about the dangers of manipulation - or omission - from their soldiers to honestly report.
Since the fall of Saigon, all services have placed greater emphasis on gathering intact information from the field and incorporating lessons learned there into training and doctrine. And there is a broad understanding on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the skills and strategies required to fight insurgencies and other "asymmetric conflicts" differ greatly from the requirements of simple warfare.
On January 2, 1963, Van took part in the battle around the Vietcong fortified village of Ap Bac, about 50 miles southwest of Saigon. At Ap Bac, 350 guerrillas armed with machine guns and rifles marched against more than 2,000 ARVN troops and their US advisers.
The ARVN attacked armored personnel carriers (APCs) under the cover of air support, including napalm as well as artillery. The VC stood their ground and attacked several ARVN companies and launched the first attack. I think the main strategic lesson of the Vietnam conflict is one of the basic logistics aspects.
If your supplies and money are cut off and not other men's. You lose and he wins. North Vietnam was not cut off by the Soviets and the Red Chinese. They won. We cut off South Vietnam.
They are lost. The DM responds to the chaos caused by the imposition of martial law. South Vietnamese special forces, originally trained by the United States and now controlled by Dim Nhu's brother, violently suppressed Buddhist sanctuaries in Saigon, Hue, and other cities.
Source: jordan.adventist.org
I think that when you discount the sincerity and importance of anti-Taliban sentiment in Afghanistan, you discount the sincerity and importance of anti-communist sentiment in the South. In one case, and in the other, there were many who feared and hated the Communists and feared and hated the Taliban.
They decide for themselves. We have not decided for them. They decided that neither Communism nor Taliban was best for them and they fought against it. Say we decide what is best for us and they are not egoistic.
They have the ability to fully decide what is best for them. To suggest that we have done that is to make the whole thing about us. Second, I never argued that many people in the South did not want to be Communists.
But you miss the ideological point of rebellion. Leaders choose messages that speak to target audiences to facilitate success. Ho and Giap were seen to be opting for a communist/land reform agenda and adopting a Maoist strategy.
It's right for the people they're trying to motivate and it works. Most people in the South have been affected, especially in rural areas where farmers are employed. You also need to know that most of the people in the voting cities in the South are either deliberately imported from the North or who have fled from the North, raising more doubts about the "true".
The well-documented electoral corruption in the South cannot be ignored either. October 1961 - To get a firsthand look at the deteriorating military situation, Kennedy's top aides Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow visit Vietnam. "If Vietnam goes, it will be very strong," he said.
Taylor briefed the president and advised Kennedy to increase the number of US military advisers and send 8,000 combat troops. November 1, 1964 - The first Viet Cong attack against the Americans in Vietnam takes place at Bien Hoa Air Force Base, 12 miles north of Saigon.
Source: cdnn1.img.sputniknews.com
A mortar attack earlier in the day killed five Americans, two South Vietnamese, and wounded nearly 100 others. President Johnson rejected all recommendations for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. As a result, Diem ordered bombing raids against suspected Viet Cong controlled villages.
Air strikes by the South Vietnamese Air Force were supported by US bombers who carried out a number of bombing raids. Civic causes undermined popular support for Diem and resulted in increased peasant hostility toward the United States, which was heavily blamed for unpopular programs as well as bombings.
Pierce immediately ran over, leading his man into the bunker. "As I did," he said. "I saw an ARVN soldier run up behind him and shoot up his cabin in a hammock where I must have been sleeping. Just as the mortar gun started to fall, the ARVN position on the left opened fire on our 50 cal machine gun group. I saw it too.
ARVN soldiers run into company headquarters throwing grenades, waves of Viet Cong whistle and deadly automatic weapons lie in the wire compound. thorn in 15 minutes. August 7, 1964 - In response to two incidents involving Maddox and Turner, President Johnson tells the U.S. Congress.
The Gulf of Tonkin is ordered crossed. Going forward, the White House authorizes the president to "take all necessary measures, including the use of force," to prevent further attacks against US forces. The resolution was approved unanimously in Congress and 98-2 in the Senate, President Johnson.
Given enormous power to pay unproven salaries for the Vietnam War from the White House. Most of the attacks on advisers are considered VC intrusions, which may be real, but I'm not sure how you can trust that.
(same as in Afghanistan) unless you get a chance to ask them questions. I don't think the data is there, so will try to extract it from the articles. January 3, 1963 - The US News Front builds 350 Viet Cong radio transmitters following the Viet Cong victory in the Battle of AP Bac.
Source: i0.wp.com
Three US helicopter crew members were killed. Despite the physical hardships, Zinni said the experience gave him the "war spirit" and made him realize that the United States had failed to give the South Vietnamese enough reason to put him down.
their lives. "If we can't win the hearts of the people, if we can't give them anything to fight for, if we don't agree to guarantee that the government is accountable to the people and we don't agree. "The premise of infinite supply.
After all, despite all the victories on the battlefield, we cannot win the conflict." Gentlemen, you are not a romantic bunch, as this civilian (like me) knows for sure. However, let me dismiss this informative discussion regardless of the fact that it teaches a lot.
Am. Who hasn't started like you yet. Too bad it doesn't happen on other issues besides the military. We'd be a better republic for it. Thank you all. Ned McDonnell. January 20, 1961 - John Fitzgerald Kennedy United
Inaugurated and declared as the 35th President of the States, anything to ensure the survival and success of freedom.” Private President Eisenhower, who left, told him, “I think you are. Troops will be sent ... ”to Southeast Asia.
The role of the Green Berets soon expanded to include the formation of the Civil Irregular Guard (CIDG), formed by fierce mountain men known as Montagnards. These groups formed a series of fortifications in the mountain camps to prevent North Vietnamese incursions.
The South Vietnamese army was controlled by officers chosen by President Dm, not for their ability, but for their loyalty. Dim Min advised his officers to avoid harm. His main mission was to ask them to prevent any rebellion in Saigon.
Source: foreignpolicy.com
"One of the strengths of the advisory unit, apart from the fact that we don't have a council and we immerse ourselves in their institutions and culture, is that we are closely connected with the Vietnamese Marine Corps," Zinni said.
In the winter of 1963, most American eyes were not on Vietnam, even though it would be a familiar battlefield. In this lesson, students analyze a letter sent to President Kennedy from a woman who had just lost her brother in South Vietnam and then consider Kennedy's response in which he explains his reasons for sending U.S. military personnel to
that As I pointed out to Bob Jones North or South has little to do with it as many countries are artificial constructs to one degree or another. And from Wiki's brief reading of the history of the area now surrounded by Vietnam, it didn't become Vietnam until 1802.
Before that part of the region was part of the Khmer Empire and is more confusing. A set of Vietnamese states competing with or controlled by China. So I think there is historical precedence for different governments ruling different regions of what is now called Vietnam.
If after 13 years officers from abroad must give officers and men of local military units "sufficient reason to put their lives on the line" for their unit or country and "if we cannot give They have something to fight for. For ..." in the psychology of their minds that the war is over for them.
If the members of the established military units do not have it in their hearts to fight for their country and their service to make the necessary sacrifices without foreign support and encouragement after 13 years.
of existence - they are already lost. The only question is when they will give up. Caesar Smith: I want to know what's wrong. ប៉ុន្តែខ្ញុំគិតថា ទាក់ទងនឹងការទទួលយក ខ្ញុំតែងតែតស៊ូជាមួយ ខ្ញុំមិនប្រាកដថា តើវៀតណាមចង់បានជនជាតិអាមេរិកចូលដែរឬអត់ទេ ប៉ុន្តែពួកគេចង់បានប្រទេសរបស់ពួកគេមកវិញ ហើយប្រសិនបើវានឹងជួយកម្ចាត់មនុស្សគ្រប់គ្នា។ បន្ទាប់មក អ្នកក៏ត្រូវដឹងផងដែរ ក្នុងពេលដំណាលគ្នាដែលយើងកំពុងចូលមកដើម្បីផ្តល់យោបល់ និងជួយ ខ្ញុំប្រាកដថានៅក្នុងគំនិតរបស់នរណាម្នាក់ ពួកគេនឹងបញ្ចប់នៅក្រោមភាពជាជនជាតិអាមេរិក ជំនួសឱ្យការនៅក្រោមបារាំង។
ដូច្នេះហើយបើនិយាយពីការទទួលយកប៉ុន្មាន ខ្ញុំមិនប្រាកដថាវានឹងទៅណាទេ ប៉ុន្តែខ្ញុំមិនដែលមានអារម្មណ៍ថាមិនត្រូវបានគេទទួលនោះទេ។ ខ្ញុំមានអារម្មណ៍ថាដូចជាទាហានដែលខ្ញុំធ្វើការជាមួយ ប្រជាជនក្នុងប្រទេសគឺបើកចំហដូចដែលពួកគេអាចធ្វើបាន។ ប៉ុន្តែដើម្បីបញ្ជាក់ឡើងវិញ ជម្លោះមិនមែនអំពីការផ្សព្វផ្សាយលទ្ធិកុម្មុយនិស្តទេ គឺសំដៅលើការទទួលបានសេរីភាព ឯករាជ្យ ភាពស្របច្បាប់ និងអធិបតេយ្យភាព។ កុម្មុយនិស្តគ្រាន់តែជាយានជំនិះដើម្បីទៅដល់ទីនោះ។ យើងមានការភិតភ័យអំពីផលប្រយោជន៍ផ្ទាល់ខ្លួនរបស់យើង និងការរីករាលដាលនៃលទ្ធិកុម្មុយនិស្ត ដូច្នេះហើយយើងបានងាកមករកគោលការណ៍ជាមូលដ្ឋានរបស់យើងដែលមាននៅក្នុងសេចក្តីប្រកាសឯករាជ្យរបស់យើង ហើយបានសនិទានភាពថាការជួញដូរក្នុងនាមមនោគមវិជ្ជា និងផលប្រយោជន៍ជាតិ។ យើងខុស។ យើងត្រូវទទួលយកវា។ យើងបានធ្វើសកម្មភាពដោយភ័យខ្លាច។ យើងមិនបានរៀនមេរៀនទេ ហើយយើងបានអនុវត្ត "តក្កវិជ្ជា" ផ្អែកលើមនោគមវិជ្ជា/ការភ័យខ្លាចដូចគ្នាទៅនឹងរបៀបដែលយើងកំណត់គោលដៅរបស់យើងនៅក្នុងប្រទេសអាហ្វហ្គានីស្ថានផងដែរ។ យុទ្ធសាស្ត្រវៀតណាម Redux ។ Willbanks បាននិយាយថា "នៅពេលនេះ ការផ្តោតអារម្មណ៍នៃកិច្ចខិតខំប្រឹងប្រែងរបស់ខ្ញុំបានផ្លាស់ប្តូរទៅការសម្របសម្រួលការគាំទ្រការប្រយុទ្ធរបស់សហរដ្ឋអាមេរិក" Willbanks បាននិយាយថា។ "ខ្ញុំបានចំណាយពេលវេលាទាំងអស់របស់ខ្ញុំដើម្បីកែសម្រួលកាំភ្លើងធំ - យ៉ាងហោចណាស់នៅដើមដំបូង ហើយមិនយូរប៉ុន្មានយើងមិនមានកាំភ្លើងធំដើម្បីកែតម្រូវទេ - ការវាយប្រហារតាមអាកាស ហើយថែមទាំងសម្របសម្រួលឧទ្ធម្ភាគចក្រវាយប្រហារ និងកាំភ្លើងខ្លីដោយអំពាវនាវឱ្យមានការជម្លៀសផ្នែកវេជ្ជសាស្រ្ត និងសម្របសម្រួលការផ្គត់ផ្គង់ពីលើអាកាសឡើងវិញ" ។
ខណៈពេលដែលខ្ញុំពិតជាមិនមែនជាទីប្រឹក្សាជាមួយជនជាតិវៀតណាមខាងត្បូង ខ្ញុំនឹកចាំពីពេលល្ងាចនៅក្នុងក្លឹប O នៅ NAS Pensacola នៅរដូវក្តៅឆ្នាំ 1965 ដោយស្តាប់មន្រ្តី VNAF (បន្ទាប់មកបណ្តុះបណ្តាលនៅទីនោះ) ដោយបើកចំហដោយបង្ហាញពីការមិនចូលចិត្ត និងការមិនគោរពចំពោះមេដឹកនាំនយោបាយ និងយោធារបស់ប្រទេសរបស់ពួកគេ។ ហើយពួកគេបានសម្តែងការកោតសរសើរដោយបើកចំហចំពោះ "Giap" ដែលពួកគេគិតថាជាឧត្តមសេនីយម្នាក់ដែលបានបណ្តេញជនជាតិបារាំងចេញ។ សមរភូមិ Ap Bac យល់ឃើញអំពី Neil Sheehan—ដែលនិយាយអំពីសមរភូមិសម្រាប់ United Press International ហើយក្រោយមកបានសរសេរសៀវភៅដ៏អស្ចារ្យអំពី Vann នៅប្រទេសវៀតណាមដែលមានឈ្មោះថា A Bright Shining Lie—បានបង្ខំទីប្រឹក្សាអាមេរិកដែលជំរុញឱ្យចាប់ផ្តើមធ្វើបូជនីយកិច្ច “ដើម្បីបញ្ចុះបញ្ចូល ភាពជាអ្នកដឹកនាំផ្នែកយោធា និងនយោបាយនៅទីក្រុងវ៉ាស៊ីនតោន ដែលវិធីតែមួយគត់ដែលសហរដ្ឋអាមេរិកអាចជៀសវាងការវាយដំនៅវៀតណាមគឺការផ្លាស់ប្តូរយុទ្ធសាស្ត្រយ៉ាងខ្លាំង… វណ្ណ បានឃើញធាតុផ្សំនៃមហន្តរាយនេះមានភាពច្បាស់លាស់ជាងអ្នកផ្សេងទៀតនៅក្នុងប្រទេសវៀតណាមនៅពេលនោះ ហើយគាត់បានតាំងចិត្តធ្វើ។
អ្វីគ្រប់យ៉ាងដែលគាត់អាចការពារបាន»។ ជោគជ័យយុទ្ធសាស្ត្រ 100 គឺដូចជាអាច 100 ឈុតនៃការជំរុញ 1 ។ វាអាចមើលទៅល្អនៅលើក្រដាស ប៉ុន្តែវាមិនធ្វើឱ្យអ្នកក្លាយជាស្តុបទេ។ ជាពិសេសនៅពេលដែលជោគជ័យនៃយុទ្ធសាស្ត្រតែមួយនោះ អមដោយការយល់ច្រលំទាំងស្រុង ហើយដូច្នេះមិនអើពើនឹងការបរាជ័យជាយុទ្ធសាស្ត្រ។
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